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h i g h l i g h t s
• In a principal–agent setting, we explore heterogeneous relative concerns of agents.
• We find that firms may not always benefit from such heterogeneity.
• They only benefit when the difference outweighs the difference in agents’ abilities.
• We next account for the influence of other co-workers on agents’ relative concerns.
• Now, firms make lower profits relative to the no-comparisons benchmark.
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a b s t r a c t
In a principal–agentmodel, we find that firmsmay not always benefit from the relative concerns of agents
if such concerns are heterogeneous. Further, accounting for the influence of the environment on such
concerns, profits are reduced relative to the no-comparisons benchmark.
© 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).lIf status is to play a role in economic behavior, then, the benefit of
status in economic environments must be explored.
[— Ball and Eckel 1998, p. 501.]
1. Introduction
There is little doubt that status or relative concerns affect
agents’ choices and behavior. Such influence in firms and mar-
kets was first documented by Duesenberry (1949) and Leibenstein
(1950) and more recently by Frank (1985), Ball and Eckel (1998)
and Ball et al. (2001), to name a few. Previous work has found
that firms benefit from the presence of status-minded employees.
For instance, Fershtman et al. (2006), Frey (2007) and Besley and
Ghatak (2008) find that employees motivated by relative compar-
isons require lower monetary incentives for effort.
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0/).Previousworkhasmostly focused on symmetric agents in firms,
i.e., all agents display the same intensity of concern for relative
comparisons. An exception is Fershtman et al. (2006)who consider
agents who either care about status or do not. However, agents are
still one of the two extreme types. Another plausible situation is
one where agents care about comparisons but to varying degrees.
In such situations, we find that firms may not always benefit from
the relative concerns of their employees. Firms only make higher
profits when differences in relative concerns outweigh the differ-
ence in abilities between agents.
To see if such a situation is likely, we relax another common as-
sumption— that agents care about comparisons to the samedegree
with all co-workers. There is growing evidence that ‘‘players’ re-
gard for one anothermay depend onwho the opponent is’’ (Levine,
1998, p. 598) and that such regard is shaped by the institu-
tions and culture in which agents interact (Bowles, 1998). Us-
ing the framework of Raub (1990), environmental features have
been shown to influence the level of altruism (Rotemberg, 1994),
e under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.
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Rauh, 2010) in agency relationships.
Following the approach of Casadesus-Masanell (2004), we
explore such ‘‘context-dependence’’ of agents’ relative concerns in
the firm.We find that it is only the less able agents who care about
comparisons and work harder, a prediction that is supported by
empirical evidence. However, this negatively impacts firm profits
relative to a situation when no agent cares about comparisons.
2. A model of relative concerns
We consider a moral-hazard model with one principal and
two agents (Fershtman et al., 2006). Agents produce observable
outputs of identical commodities, qi, which are non-deterministic
functions of effort, ei:
qi = ei + ϵi, i = 1, 2, (1)
where E[ϵi] = 0. We assume linear wage schemes1:
wi = αi + βiqi, i = 1, 2, (2)
where αi is a fixed salary and βi is the bonus or incentive
component.2
It is easy to see that agentswhose outputs depend on each other
might care about relative concerns.We explore if relative concerns
play a role even when there are no technological interdependen-
cies in production, i.e., ∂qi/∂qj = 0. The expected profit of the risk-
neutral principal is given by
Π = e1 − (α1 + β1e1)+ e2 − (α2 + β2e2). (3)
In addition to standard payoffs, we assume that agents also care
about relative performance.3 The expected utility of risk-neutral
agent i is given by4
Ui = αi + βiei − kie
2
i
2
+ δi(ei − ej), i = 1, 2, i ≠ j, (4)
where δi ∈ R+ is the importance agent i attaches to comparisons
and 12kie
2
i (ki > 0) is agent i’s cost of effort. Reservation utility, U¯i,
is normalized to zero. We assume that k1 ≥ k2, i.e., agent 2 is more
able than agent 1. We allow for heterogeneous relative concerns,
i.e., δ1 ≠ δ2.
Following Rotemberg (1994), we term an agent’s utility as
defined above as ‘‘behavior payoffs’’ and his utility when δi = 0
(the standard case) his ‘‘material payoffs’’. This distinction between
the ‘‘acting self’’ and ‘‘object self’’ in economics goes back to at
least Akerlof (1983) and Rabin (1993). Context-dependence is
captured by modeling the intensity of relative comparisons, δi, as
being chosen to maximize agent i’s material payoffs within the
environment, here the firm (Raub, 1990). Following Casadesus-
Masanell (2004), wemodel the choice as one by agents themselves.
Rotemberg (1994) argues that an individual’s ‘‘inner self’’ is
motivated by material payoffs but can shape behavior payoffs
that determine the actions of the ‘‘outer self’’. For our purposes,
it is not important that agents choose δi. They could instead be
a result of parents choosing values for their children (Akerlof,
1983) or ‘‘behavioral conditioning’’ by society (Bernheim, 1994) to
maximize chances of economic success in the workplace. It is only
important that the choice is made prior to the interaction and that
agents commit to their choices (Frank, 1987).
The timing in the game is: (i) agents simultaneously choose
δi and δj, (ii) the principal observes behavior payoffs and makes
1 While the linear contract is generally suboptimal, Bose et al. (2011) provide a
strong empirical justification for its use in this standard case.
2 Our results hold if wages depend on the other agent’s output.
3 See, for instance, Azmat and Iriberri (2010) on the impact of relative perfor-
mance information on effort.
4 All results remain unchanged if we instead assume negative exponential utility.take-it-or-leave-it contract offers,5 (iii) if agents accept, efforts and
outputs are realized. We solve the game by backward induction
using standard techniques (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005) and
proofs are omitted.
Agents’ chosen efforts from stage (iii) and the contract param-
eters from stage (ii) are6
ei = (βi + δi)/ki and βi = 1− δj, i = 1, 2, i ≠ j. (5)
2.1. Benchmark — no relative concerns
In the benchmark case with no relative concerns (δi = δj =
0), the principal offers ‘‘selling-the-store’’ contracts, i.e., βBi = 1.
Individual efforts and the total effort in the benchmark equilibrium
case are given by
eBi = 1/ki and eB ≡ eB1 + eB2 =
k1 + k2
k1k2
. (6)
Agents’ wages and the firm’s total wage bill are
wBi = 1/2ki and wB ≡ wB1 + wB2 =
k1 + k2
2k1k2
(7)
and firm profits are
ΠB = k1 + k2
2k1k2
. (8)
2.2. Heterogeneous relative concerns
When δi, δj > 0, individual effort and the wage bill are
ei = 1+ δi − δjki and w = (k1 + k2)[1− (δ1 − δ2)
2]
2k1k2
(9)
and firm profits are
Π = k1(1− δ1 + δ2)2 + k2(1+ δ1 − δ2)2
2k1k2
> 0. (10)
While the firm’s wage bill goes down (w − wB < 0), it is not
clear what happens to the total effort in the firm; effort increases
for the agent who has stronger relative concerns while it decreases
for the other agent. As a result, the effect on profits is not clear,
Π −ΠB ≥ 0⇔ δ1 − δ2 ≥ 2(k1 − k2)k1 + k2 (≥ 0). (11)
Proposition 1. With heterogeneous relative concerns, firms only
gain if the difference in agents’ relative concerns outweighs the
difference in their abilities.
Utility from favorable comparisons can provide some compen-
sation for agents’ effort costs. Condition (11) stipulates that agents’
increase in utility from concerns is large enough to compensate for
the greater share of the effort cost (from k1 and k2) borne by the
agents due to reduced wages. That is, firms can gain only if relative
concerns are strong enough to not cause a significant reduction in
effort despite the reduction in wages.
Note that if k1 = k2, the firm gains only if agents have hetero-
geneous relative concerns.
2.3. Context dependent relative concerns
Given the participation constraint, agent i’s material utility can
be written as−δi(ei − ej). Simultaneous maximization in stage (i)
yields
δ∗1 =
k1 − k2
2(k1 + k2) > 0 and δ
∗
2 = 0. (12)
5 We assume that the principal has all the bargaining power.
6 The first-order approach is valid.
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while the more able agent does not.
Note that if k1 = k2, δ1 = δ2 = 0.
Corollary 1. If agents are of the same ability, neither agent cares
about relative comparisons.
Incentives, individual efforts and wages in the equilibrium are
given by
β∗1 = 1 = βB1 and β∗2 =
(k1 + 3k2)
2k2(k1 + k2) < 1 = β
B
2 (13)
e∗1 =
3k1 + k2
2k1(k1 + k2) > e
B
1 and e
∗
2 =
k1 + 3k2
2k2(k1 + k2) < e
B
2 (14)
w∗1 =
2k31 + k1k2(7k1 + 4k2)+ 3k32
8k1k2(k1 + k2)2 > w
B
1 and
w∗2 =
(k1 + 3k2)2
8k2(k1 + k2)2 < w
B
2.
(15)
Firm profits in equilibrium are
Π∗ = (k1 + k2)
2 + 12k1k2
8k1k2(k1 + k2) > 0. (16)
At the equilibrium, (11) is not satisfied. Thus, firm profits are
reduced in equilibrium,
Π∗ −ΠB = − 3(k1 − k2)
2
8k1k2(k1 + k2) < 0. (17)
Proposition 3. With context-dependent relative concerns, profits are
reduced relative to the no-comparisons benchmark.
Relative to the benchmark, incentives are weaker for the more
able agent while they are unchanged for the less able agent. Thus,
only the less productive agent (agent 1) works harder in the equi-
librium due to the additional motivation through relative compar-
isons. This finding is supported by evidence from the laboratory
and the field. Falk and Ichino (2006) find that less productive ex-
perimental subjects work harder while more productive ones ei-
ther reduce or do not change their efforts. Mas and Moretti (2009)
find a similar effect among supermarket checkout clerks.
As a result, the principal pays the less able agent a higher
wage while reducing the wage of the more able agent. While the
principal saves on the wage bill, total effort is also reduced relative
to the benchmark.
e∗ − eB = − (k1 − k2)
2
2k1k2(k1 + k2) < 0 (18)
and
w∗ − wB = − (k1 − k2)
2
8k1k2(k1 + k2) < 0. (19)
However, increasing effort costs and different abilities imply
that agent 2’s reduction in effort reduces his wage by less thanagent 1’s increase in effort increases his wage. As a result, the
total reduction in effort outweighs the saving in wages. Thus, once
we allow for the influence of others in the workplace on agents’
relative concerns, we find that profits are lowered relative to the
no-comparisons benchmark.
3. Conclusion
In a principal–agent setting, we find that when agents have
heterogeneous relative concerns, firms may make higher or lower
profits relative to a benchmarkwith no relative concerns. However,
once we account for the influence of the work environment on
such concerns, we find that firms make lower profits despite the
incentive effects of relative comparisons. This is because relative
concerns are not strong enough to allow significant savings in
wages without hurting productivity.
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